

Ticker (ETR): S92

Share Price: €29.04

Target Price: €20.00

%Overvalued: 31%

## **RECOMMENDATION: SELL**

**Negative earnings:** Since their very profitable years from 2009 to 2012 the company has struggled to adjust to the downward pressure on pricing brought on by increased competition. They have average earnings before tax of -€17.7 million across the last 7 years.

**Small Margins:** SMA operate on small margins, their COGS and SG&A combined is over 90% of revenue.

**Subsidy Reduction:** Although subsidies have been extended in the near term, the long-term goal for the majority of countries is to get to a point where renewables are subsidy free. This will hinder the long-term growth of solar companies and particularly SMA who operate in many regions.

Verdict: Although SMA is a global company that has been around since 1981 and operates across the globe, we believe overall growth potential is limited. Earnings before tax has been negative four out of the last seven years.

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## 1 Company Overview

SMA Solar Technology is a German solar energy company founded in 1981 and headquartered in Germany. They operate in countries all over world, however their production facilities are located in Poland and Germany. They have a total installed base of 21GW in the Americas, 44GW in EMEA (Europe, Middle East & Africa), and 20GW in APAC (Asia-Pacific). Their portfolio of products consists of mainly of PV inverters, which are required to convert the AC electricity generated by solar modules into usable DC electricity. They also produce and develop battery inverters as well as providing operation and maintenance services and software services. The revenue in recent years has been lower than the highs of 2010-2012 in large part due to the downward pressure in pricing brought on by increased competition from companies mainly located in China. They generated revenue in 2019 of €915million.



Figure 1.1 SMA Share Price Across Last 6 Months

# 2 Forecasting

#### 2.1 Revenue

SMA operate in many countries, however, in their annual reports they break down revenue into the 3 regions outlined previously. Although they don't breakdown revenue by country, they indicate in their latest annual report that the 3 most important countries are Germany (EMEA), Australia (APAC) and the US (Americas). Given how subsidies in different countries are dictated by national government policies we have forecast revenue by region using the German, US and Australian markets as proxies for the larger geographical regions.




Figure 2.1 2019 Revenue by Region

#### 2.2 The Americas

The main impact on the US solar market is the ITC (investment tax credit). It is a solar tax credit in the US which allows the owner to deduct a certain percentage of the cost of the system from their tax bill. This tax credit was 30% in 2019 but is starting its scheduled stepdown in 2020. How this is projected forward will cause a change in our valuation. In order to forecast the revenue for the American market we have analysed two possible scenarios. This was done in order to account for the possible party shift due to the general election this year. In each scenario the possible revenue figures are forecasted and subsequently a weighted sum of the two figures is calculated to forecast the revenue. The weightings are based on the probability of election in the US.

Table 2.1 US Presidential Election Probability

Candidate	Odds	Implied Probability	Adjusted Probability
President Trump	10/11	52.38%	53.46%
Candidate Biden	6/5	45.45%	46.54%
Nearest Candidate	22/1	4.35%	~

Source: Paddy Power

\*Note: in table 2.1 the implied probabilities are calculated from bookmaker odds, in this case the implied probability being over 100% simply implies you would incur a loss if you backed all outcomes. The adjusted probabilities are based on either President Trump or Candidate Biden getting elected.

Under scenario 1 President Trump is re-elected and the ITC maintains its scheduled stepdown. Under scenario 2 Candidate Biden is elected and the ITC is maintained at 22%. Candidate Biden has a very strong climate change policy that includes a \$1.7 trillion dollar investment and a target of zero net emissions by 2050. While these are extremely ambitious targets he has a positive track-record. He was Vice-President in the Obama administration which oversaw the largest every capital investment in the clean energy sector of \$90 billion. At a minimum the

ITC should not reduce below its 2021 level should Candidate Biden get elected. For ITC schedules see appendix.

Year	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Revenue (€millions)	275.68	401.25	283.10	229.89	211.16	216.44	220.12
YoY Growth (%)	45.55%	45.55%	-29.44%	-18.80%	-8.15%	2.50%	1.80%

Table 2.2 Revenue Forecast for US Region Under Biden Presidency

## **Growth Rate Explanation**

2020 was the first year that the ITC reduced from its 30% level. This generated safe-harbour revenue for solar companies where customers are entitled to claim the 30% tax credit if they achieve minimal completion targets ( $\sim$ 5%). This leads to firms buying solar components, in essence 'harbouring' them for future years, thus boosting solar companies revenue. The YoY revenue growth in 2019 in the American region is attributable to this practice. Given that the ITC is scheduled to step down in 2021 and again in 2022 we forecast this growth (45.55%) to continue for these years. The negative growth figure in 2022 is equivalent to the growth YoY in 2018 (-29.44%) when tariffs were imposed on imported goods in the US. With Trump continuing in office we forecast these tariffs combined with zero safe-harbour revenue to negatively impact growth in the same manner as growth was affected in 2018. The tariffs negatively impact growth until 2025 when it is likely under this scenario the democrats retain power and the tariffs are removed. Since 1950 the same political party has remained in office for 3 consecutive terms on just one occasion, from 1981 to 1993. With the democrats in office the company can again achieve positive growth. The terminal growth value is the long term US GDP growth rate according to PWC as the policies of the respective parties will even out across a long time horizon.

Year	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Revenue	264.25	288.84	310.80	329.14	342.97	351.55	357.52
(€millions)							
YoY	11.01%	9.30%	7.60%	5.90%	4.20%	2.50%	1.80%
Growth (%)							

Table 2.3 Revenue Forecast for US Region Under Trump Re-election

#### **Growth Rate Explanation**

The growth in 2020 is lower than in scenario 1 as companies do not need to engage in safe-harbouring. However, the current tariffs are removed with Candidate Biden projected in office which enables SMA to continue to grow. The 11.01% figure is the CAGR figure from 2013 to 2017 in the American market. We have taken the average of the 2016 and 2017 revenues in our calculation. The reason for this is that originally the ITC was expected to expire in 2016 so revenue generated from projects was higher than normal as projects were being completed before the expected expiration of the ITC. The 2017 revenue was also hurt by the talks of

potential tariffs. We believe taking the average of these two years is the best representation of the real growth in the American market. The reduction in revenue in 2018 due to the tariffs has also been added back to the 2020 figure (~€60million). The growth rate slows down over time towards the terminal value of 1.8% again taken as the long term US GDP growth rate. This slow-down is attributable to increased competition from US companies.

Table 2.4 Weighted US Region Revenue Forecast

Year	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Revenue	270.25	347.85	296.26	277.04	273.77	280.61	285.39
(€millions)							

#### 2.3 EMEA

Table 2.5 Revenue Forecast for EMEA Region

Year	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Revenue	501.88	557.43	607.18	648.38	678.47	695.43	707.26
(€millions)							
YoY	13.21%	11.07%	8.93%	6.78%	4.64%	2.50%	1.30%
Growth (%)							

### **Growth Rate Explanation**

The EMEA market generates the highest revenue for SMA. Recently the German government removed a cap on solar projects that were eligible for subsidies meaning the level of subsidisation will remain unchanged from previous years. However, solar power in Europe is increasingly heading towards being subsidy free, there is currently a 180MW solar farm under construction in Germany that is unsubsidised. As the subsidies continue to phase out over time the growth of the industry will be adversely affected. Given that Germany is the largest market in the EMEA region we have used the CAGR over the past 4 years to forecast the 2020 growth rate. Thereafter we have growth slowing to the terminal EU GDP growth rate of 1.3%

### 2.4 APAC

Table 2.6 Revenue Forecast for APAC Region

Year	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Revenue	213.99	192.49	224.56	251.37	269.52	276.26	280.96
(€millions)							
YoY	-10.05%	-10.05%	16.66%	11.94%	7.22%	2.50%	2.5%
Growth (%)							

#### Growth Rate Explanation

The Asia Pacific region has been the most stable over recent years with two years of positive growth in 2016 and 2017 followed by 2 years of decline in 2018 and 2019. The difference between 2016 and 2019 being an increase of 4.4%. The growth years are down to expansion in

the Australian market while the decline is caused by the subsidy cut in the Chinese market and an overall decline due to increased competition. Moving forward in 2020 and 2021 we have used the previous two years CAGR (-10.05%) as there are further subsidy cuts in 2020 and beyond taking place in the Chinese market. Subsidies in 2020 have been reduced by 50% and the government has said it intends to be subsidy free in subsequent years. These factors lead to further decline while the growth in the Australian market outweighs this decline from 2022 onward. For the 2022 growth figure we have used the CAGR from 2017-2019 (16.66%). The slower subsequent growth is down to the phasing out of subsidies over time and similarly increased competition to eventually arrive at the long term Australian GDP growth rate.

## 2.5 Coronavirus Impact

Given the current economic climate we though it prudent to take into consideration the impact of the current worldwide pandemic on the revenue figures. It's extremely difficult to obtain company information on how they will be affected. Some have made no announcements, some have said they will not be affected, other companies have said revenue will decrease, others have completely scrapped their 2020 guidance and say their best guess is that they don't know. SMA have made one announcement regarding the pandemic in the latter half of March simply saying that their business will not be impacted. We find this difficult to believe given the current economic climate and have adjusted our 2020 figures. As we are using Germany, the US and Australia as proxies for the larger geographical regions we have analysed the potential effects in each region. In the US we have used Sunpower Corp to forecast the reduction in demand as they are the only company we could find that has made an assessment of the coronavirus impact. They have stated they expect a decrease in demand in Q2 and Q3 of between 10 and 30%. We decided to check their historical company guidance for accuracy to ascertain what figure within, or outside of, this range that we should take. Their 2019 actual figures for revenue, OpEx and EBITDA all fall close to the midpoint of their guidance with revenue being marginally higher, OpEx being marginally lower and EBITDA being right on the midpoint. For this reason we have taken the midpoint of their estimation and reduced US revenue by 20% for Q2 and Q3. The APAC region revenue figures are based on the Australian market conditions. The Australian government has announced a \$17.6 billion economic stimulus package which includes a significant aid to the solar industry, including increasing the instant asset write-off threshold for businesses by 5 times the current amount up to \$150,000. The cap on annual turnover for businesses eligible has also increased over 10% up to \$500 million. For this reason we don't forecast a material impact on the APAC revenue. For the EMEA market we have not managed to find any company announcements attaching specific estimates to the impact of coronavirus. Given that the coronavirus has hit Europe hard in Q2 we have used the drop in US demand as a proxy. We have not altered Q3 demand as Europe appears to be coming out of the worst of the pandemic with strict lockdown measures having a significant impact at slowing the virus.

Table 2.7 Total Revenue Forecast Adjusted for Coronavirus Impact

Year	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Revenue	986.12	1097.77	1128.00	1176.78	1221.77	1252.31	1273.60
(€millions)							

The general trend around the globe is that governments are trying to create subsidy free renewable energy sectors. While this hurts the growth of the industry, we believe long term growth is still possible, all be it at a slower pace. As mentioned previously there is currently a 180MW project under construction in Germany that is subsidy free, proving that it is possible for solar companies to exist in a subsidy free world. Moving forward we believe SMA's global presence and access to all markets will enable them to have positive long term growth. SMA has also been around since 1981 and have shown they can withstand different market climates.

### 2.6 COGS and SG&A




Figure 2.2 Historical Revenue & COGS Growth Rates

For COGS we have looked at the growth rate when compared with revenue, they largely move in line with another, however, in 2019 COGS reduced by 3.4% as a percentage of revenue due to restructuring cost saving measures undertaken by the firm. In 2020 we forecast a further reduction in COGS enabled by continued restructuring savings undertaken by the firm as well as a decrease in the downward pressure on pricing. This downward pressure on pricing has largely come from Chinese manufacturers that are able to operate at low margins due to large government subsidies. These subsidies are reduced by 50% in 2020. The reduction down to 74% of revenue is also line with the average over the last 8 years. From 2021 onwards we forecast COGS to grow in line with revenue as has historically been the case.

For SG&A moving forward we use the average % revenue over the last 5 years of 17.6%.

## 2.7 D&A and Capex

For D&A we have used the company's guidance for 2020 and increased it by 15%. This is the amount by which they historically underestimate their D&A figure by.

For Capex it was necessary for us to take into account the building cycle in order to facilitate future expansion. Between 2013 and 2019 the company was not expanding its facilities and we have calculated the capex as % of revenue over this period to be on average 5%. During 2010 and 2013 the company was expanding and after accounting for maintenance Capex of 5% per annum leaves \$200 million spent on Capex over that period for expansion. We do not foresee major expansion Capex in the immediate years and have used 5% of revenue until our terminal value. We have increased the terminal Capex value to 6% as over a 15 year period this equates to approximately \$200 million additional Capex for expansion. This allows the company to expand in order to achieve future revenue growth.

#### 2.8 Tax

For the tax rate we have used the weighted tax rate of the 3 countries we are using as proxies for the larger geographical regions. This leads us to a tax rate of approximately 20%.

## 3 Valuation

## 3.1 Methodology

The intrinsic valuation of SMA solar technology is based on projected future operations in the three major regions (Americas, EMEA and APAC). The company's revenue is dominated by the U.S, German and Australian markets. Hence, we believe these countries will continue to generate the majority of the revenue. SMA doesn't provide a detailed breakdown of revenues, we therefore use the U.S, German and Australian markets as proxies to guide our projections. STOXX EUROPE 600 index was applied to track the European market return. The company has a pretty stable record of D/E ratio, so, our report adopted the WACC as the discount factor. We relied on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to derive cost of equity using levered beta. Beta estimation is based on the past 10 years of monthly stock returns and a 5-year rolling window.

### 3.2 D/E Ratio




Figure 3.1 Debt/Equity Ratio

The company's D/E ratio has been pretty stable in past 5 years around 4-8 percent. We believe the company has a target capital structure and will maintain the current D/E ratio of 8% going forward.

### 3.3 Beta Estimation




Figure 3.2 Rolling Beta

The variations of the company beta were mainly subject to the company's revenues. The peak beta level observed in 2014 was caused by a significant deterioration of subsidies in the EU and an increase in competition from China which led to a downward pressure on pricing and a negative impact on demand. SMA suffered their greatest loss in the same financial year. The recent increase is driven by the pandemic. Other than these two periods, the company beta has been relatively stable over the years. The increases and decreases were responses to the company's revenue performances. Going forward, we believe the current pandemic will further

drive up the beta and subsequently beta will restore to the level (recent three-year average) prior to the Covid-19 situation from 2022 onwards.

Table 3.1 Beta Estimation

E2020	E2021	E2022	E2023	E2024	E2025	Averaged Beta
1.25	1	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.92

### 3.4 Market Return

Under Covid-19, businesses have been shut down (and not all SMEs will survive the crisis), employment rates are trending towards new record highs as well as a foreseeable increase in government debt due to economic stimulation packages. The uncertainties this pandemic poses are beyond the recovery from a disease. In financial modelling, market return is usually set between 4 to 8%. Going forward, as we are currently in the middle of a crisis and we don't see the side effects going way immediately post COVID-19, we have taken 5% as the future market return for our forecasting period.

#### 3.5 Risk-Free Rate




Figure 3.3 Risk-Free Rate

The European triple-A countries government bonds had a negative rate even before the pandemic. ECB used the interest rate to combat the 2008 financial crisis and the following European sovereign debt crisis. Meanwhile, interest rates have been the major monetary tool that ECB employed actively to get the target inflation of 2 percent. Going forward, we don't think the future Eurozone economic outlook will improve instantly and the current pandemic poses further downward pressure on the economy. Therefore, we believe the negative rate will be maintained by within our forecasting period and we use the current -0.41 percent as our risk-free rate.

### 3.6 Cost of Debt

The cost of debt for SMA at the end of 2019 financial year was 4.3 percent. For future cost of equity, we project it will be maintained at the current level as we believe the macroeconomic environment for debt financing will not shift.

## 3.7 Cost of Equity &WACC

Table 3.2 (a) Cost of Equity (b) WACC

(	<i>a)</i>
	CAPM
rf	-0.41%
rm	5.00%
Beta	0.92
rm-rf	5.41%
re	4 58%

V	VACC
D/(D+E)	7.59%
E/(D+E	92.41%
re	4.58%
rd	4.29%
Tax rate	20.00%
WACC	4.49%

(b)

Based on our above assumptions we get a cost equity of 4.58% and the WACC of 4.49% respectively.

#### 3.8 DCF

Table 3.3 Terminal Growth Stage

Termiı	nal stage
g	1.7%
Cogs	74.0%
SG&A	17.6%

The terminal growth of 1.7% is based on the weighted average of the projected long-term GDP growth rates in each region as outlined in table 3.4.

Table 3.4 Long-Term GDP Growth Rate by Region

	Weights	pwc forecast	OECD forecast
U.S.	25.3%	1.8%	1.5%
Australia	22.0%	2.5%	2.0%
EU	52.7%	1.3%	1.6%
Weighted Aaverage		1.7%	1.7%

The weights are derived by using the average market shares within our forecasting period and we used two difference sources of the forecast that yields the same results. Additionally, we set COGS and SG&A constant in the terminal stage.

Table 3.5 (a) Discounted Cashflows (b) Valuation

(a) (b)

Year	CF
E2020	-1.5
E2021	-13.9
E2022	16.9
E2023	10.9
E2024	12.7
E2025	17.4
Terminal	389.9
DCFs	432.3
Net debt	-261.9
Equity value	694.1

	Value (€ millions)	€ per share
Equity Value	694.1	20
Market Value	1007.7	29.04
Difference	31%	31%

The intrinsic value of SMA solar technology based on our valuation is € 694.1 million

## 4 Recommendation: Sell

If we compare the estimated equity value to the current stock price of €29.04 (2<sup>rd</sup> May), our DCF valuation indicates a 31% overvaluation. We therefore recommend a sell for SMA Solar Technology. The company's future operations in the U.S market carry great risk due to the political uncertainties. The results of the next general election will affect the future ITC scheme as well as the tariffs on imported European goods to the US. Additionally, the industry has seen a significant increase in competition in recent years, which has driven up COGS as % revenue. The intense competition has been characteristic of the industry and will continue to be the norm. Moving forward, we don't think the company can reduce costs significantly. Thus, SMA will maintain low or even negative earnings in future. They have had negative earnings before tax in four out of the last seven years with an average of €-17.7 million across this period. Additionally, although in the short term there are subsidies available, many countries are moving towards creating subsidy free renewable energy sectors which will hurt the long-term growth of solar.

## 4.1 What Does the Market Have Wrong?

In any DCF the terminal cashflow assumptions have the most significant impact on generating the market price. In order to obtain the current market value, we believe the most plausible area to adjust, and what the market may have different, is COGS. COGS has been on average 74.1% revenue over the last 5 years while it was 72.7% over the last 10 years. We have projected COGS at 74% from 2020 onwards. Subsidies in China are reduced by 50% in 2020 and the aim of the Chinese Government, as well as many other governments, is to create subsidy free renewable energy sectors. This reduction in subsidisation in China should ease the downward pressure on pricing and we have accounted for this in our YoY COGS decrease in 2020 of 3.4%. However, over a longer time horizon, we do not foresee COGS continually decreasing. The market is more mature and there are more solar companies around today than there were

in the past. As companies need to adjust to succeed in a subsidy free world, competition will still exist, and pricing competition will still exist which will make it difficult for solar companies to achieve the margins of 10 years ago. If you use the average COGS as % revenue over the last 10 years you will get back the market price. We do not believe this is achievable. We believe the average figure over the previous 5 years is more representative of what will happen in the future and this value (74.1%) is in line with our long run rate of 74%.

## 5 Important Disclaimer

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## 6 Appendix

### 6.1 ITC Schedules

Table 6.1 Forecast ITC Schedule Under Trump Re-election

Year	2019	2020	2021	2022 onwards		
ITC	30%	26%	22%	Commercial 10%		
				Residential 0%		

Table 6.2 Forecast ITC schedule Under Biden Presidency

Year	2019	2020	2021	2022 onwards
ITC	30%	26%	22%	22%

# 6.2 Valuation Spreadsheet

(€ millions)	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	E2020	E2021	E2022	E2023	E2024	E2025	Terminal CF
Total Revenue	934.3	1,920.1	1,676.3	1,463.4	932.5	805.4	981.8	946.7	891.1	760.9	915.1	986.12			1176.78			1273.60
		105.5%	-12.7%	-12.7%	-36.3%	-13.6%	21.9%	-3.6%	-5.9%	-14.6%	20.3%	7.8%	11.3%	2.8%	4.3%	3.8%	2.5%	1.7%
COGS	581.5	1,205.1	1,164.1	1,056.5	718.3	605.7	706.7	641.4	646.5	615.2	708.0	729.7	812.3	834.7	870.8	904.1	926.7	942.5
	62.2%	62.8%	69.4%	72.2%	77.0%	75.2%	72.0%	67.8%	72.6%	80.8%	77.4%	74.0%	74.0%	74.0%	74.0%	74.0%	74.0%	74.0%
Gross profit	352.8	715.0	512.2	406.9	214.3	199.8	275.2	305.3	244.6	145.8	207.1	256.4	285.4	293.3	306.0	317.7	325.6	331.1
SG&A	106.5	100.3	212.0	224.6	192.5	215.9	163.6	156.3	158.7	139.0	169.9	173.6	193.2	198.5	207.1	215.0	220.4	224.2
	11.4%	5.2%	12.6%	15.3%	20.6%	26.8%	16.7%	16.5%	17.8%	18.3%	18.6%	17.6%	17.6%	17.6%	17.6%	17.6%	17.6%	17.6%
D&A	16.3	33.4	50.4	69.9	83.6	93.6	79.0	76.7	53.2	81.6	52.5	52.0	57.9	59.5	62.1	64.4	66.0	67.2
	1.7%	1.7%	3.0%	4.8%	9.0%	11.6%	8.0%	8.1%	6.0%	10.7%	5.7%	5.3%	5.3%	5.3%	5.3%	5.3%	5.3%	5.3%
EBIT	230.0	581.3	249.8	112.4	-61.9	-109.7	32.6	72.3	32.7	-74.8	-15.3	30.8	34.3	35.3	36.8	38.2	39.2	39.8
Debt	40.4	21.2	33.9	35.6	73.4	69.4	46.9	40.4	20.8	18.0	34.2	36.9	41.1	42.2	44.0	45.7	46.8	47.6
	4.3%	1.1%	2.0%	2.4%	7.9%	8.6%	4.8%	4.3%	2.3%	2.4%	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%
Interest expenses	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.1	3.9	3.9	5.3	3.6	1.1	2.0	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0
EBT												29.3	32.6	33.5	34.9	36.2	37.1	37.8
Tax	71.1	153.1	77.5	29.6	-22.0	11.4	15.3	30.0	13.4	9.1	-2.2	5.8	6.5	6.6	6.9	7.2	7.4	7.5
NOPLAT												25.0	27.9	28.6	29.9	31.0	31.8	32.3
Plus D&A												77.0	85.8	88.1	91.9	95.4	97.8	99.5
WC	327.5	570.3	528.4	564.1	453.2	347.9	380.6	451.8	538.5	385.6	377.4	406.7	452.8	465.3	485.4	503.9	516.5	525.3
	35.0%	29.7%	31.5%	38.6%	48.6%	43.2%	38.8%	47.7%	60.4%	50.7%	41.2%	41.2%	41.2%	41.2%	41.2%	41.2%	41.2%	41.2%
Less Change in NWC		242.8	-41.8	35.7	-110.9	-105.3	32.6	71.3	86.7	-152.9	-8.2	29.3	46.0	12.5	20.1	18.6	12.6	8.8
Capex	82.1	158.3	161.3	100.2	53.2	75.5	48.3	29.0	33.2	40.3	27.6	49.3	54.9	56.4	58.8	61.1	62.6	76.4
	8.8%	8.2%	9.6%	6.8%	5.7%	9.4%	4.9%	3.1%	3.7%	5.3%	3.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	6.0%
Free CF												-1.6	-15.2	19.2	13.0	15.8	22.6	14.3
PV of CF												-1.5	-13.9	16.9	10.9	12.7	17.4	389.9
DCFs	432.3																	
Net debt	-261.9																	

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